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An Integrated Approach to Evaluating Risk Mitigation 
Measures for UAV Operational Concepts in the NAS 
Roland E. Weibel* and R. John Hansman, Jr.†
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 02139 
An integrated approach is outlined in this paper to evaluate risks posed by operating 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the National Airspace System.  The approach supports the 
systematic evaluation of potential risk mitigation measures recognizing key issues in creation 
of regulatory and safety policy, including public perception and UAV market forces.  Risk 
mitigation measures are examined for two example concepts of operation: High Altitude 
Long Endurance UAV and small, local UAV operations.  Primary hazards of ground impact 
and midair collision are considered.  The examples illustrate three major areas of risk 
mitigation: exposure, recovery, and effects mitigation.  The different mitigation possibilities 
raise key issues on how to determine appropriate UAV policies to ensure that an acceptable 
level of safety is achieved. 
I. Introduction 
nmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are emerging as a new class of aircraft to be operated in the National 
Airspace System (NAS).  This emergence is driven by the success of several previous flights operated under 
Certificates of Authorization and strong demand for a variety of applications.  While there are currently no 
regulations in place to allow the routine operation of UAVs in the NAS, there is a significant effort underway to 
enable routine operations of UAVs in civil airspace in the U.S. and abroad.  Several individual UAVs are 
undergoing review for experimental certification by the FAA1.  Safety is a fundamental requirement for operation in 
the NAS, and is a key concern in evaluating potential NAS operations.  A prior analysis of ground and midair 
collision risk found most UAV operations would not meet target levels of safety without incorporation of 
mitigation2.  A variety of mitigation measures are under consideration to reduce risk levels to FAA target levels of 
safety, including operating restrictions, specific technologies, or design and reliability requirements.  There is a need 
to evaluate the effectiveness of different mitigation at reducing the risk of accidents, and understand at what points 
in the causal chain risk can be mitigated. 
U 
The purpose of this paper is to outline an approach to evaluating risk mitigation measures that integrates both 
safety policy considerations and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.  It is important to note that mitigation 
that is appropriate for one class of UAVs may not be appropriate for all classes.  Therefore there is a need to 
examine how UAV policies may vary for different concepts of operation.  To investigate this broad range, 
mitigation considerations will be discussed for examples from two different categories: High Altitude, Long 
Endurance UAVs5, and a low altitude, small UAV concept likely to be used by local law enforcement officials. In 
addition to the basic risk analysis, there are several other factors that need to be considered in support of UAV 
policy, such as the influence of public perception on safety requirements, the cost of implementation of mitigation 
measures, and functional requirements of NAS interfaces on the operation of UAVs. 
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II. The Unmanned Aerial System 
A. System Description 
A generic, systems-level representation of an Unmanned Aerial System and the operational interfaces with 
elements of the National Airspace System 
(ANS) and associated support services is shown 
in Figure 1.  The combination of an air vehicle 
and associated command and control 
architecture, including the ground station, is 
referred to as an Unmanned Aerial System 
(UAS).  With respect to safety, there is a key 
distinction between internal interfaces within 
the UAS and the external interfaces to other 
systems or services.  Figure 1 shows the 
boundary of the various relevant systems 
denoted by dashed lines and associated 
interfaces between components, denoted by 
black rectangles.  The UAS operates within the 
NAS, interacting with other NAS components 
and services in different phases of operation 
and through different interfaces.   Support 
services such as company operations and 
dispatch and maintenance also interface with 
the UAS, and influence the safety of the system.  Finally, there are interfaces internal to the UAS, between UAS air 
and ground components and human operators.  While human control is shown in the ground station, it is possible 
that future UAV flights will be flown autonomously, if sufficient performance and safety objectives can be met by 
the onboard systems. 
Functional and safety requirements in interfacing with the NAS are generally rigid.  There is more functional and 
operational flexibility within different UAS configurations.  Therefore, in the current system, it is easier to impose 
requirements on the UAS to have equivalent interactions with the NAS as manned aircraft than to change NAS 
procedures or requirements to accommodate a UAS.  However, integrating UAS into the NAS may require some 
changes in NAS procedures. 
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Figure 1: Interfaces between the UAS and NAS 
B. Concepts of Operation 
Recognizing that there is functional and architectural flexibility within the UAS system boundaries shown in 
Figure 1, a concept of operation is typically used to describe a specific UAS system.  The concept of operation 
describes the types of missions which will be performed, the technologies to be used for vehicle control and 
collision avoidance, the distribution of authority between the human operator and onboard systems, and the control 
and communications architecture for the vehicle.  The concept of operation description will be used as a baseline 
when examining the safety implications of UAS/NAS integration.  As there is a broad range of potential system 
configurations, it is expected that both the safety implications and the corresponding safety policies will vary widely 
among the spectrum of UAS concepts of operation. 
III. UAS Safety Policy 
A. Policy Process 
The key question in the introduction of UAVs into the existing national airspace system is how to generate new 
policies to ensure that safety and functionality goals are achieved.  This policy dynamic is illustrated in Figure 2, 
with emphasis placed on the dynamics of UAS operation within the existing NAS environment.  There is a current 
set of existing procedures, policies, and infrastructure which has evolved to support safe operation of manned 
aircraft.  The emergence of UAS operations drives the need to generate policies to ensure that functionality and 
safety requirements are met.  The policy generation process is driven by public perception of UAS operations, as 
well an analysis of the required policies to ensure safe operation of Unmanned Aerial Systems in the NAS, which 
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the risk assessment approach introduced in this paper will partially address.  There is a set of policies which are 
applicable to this new class of aircraft, as well as new policies that must be created. 
B. Safety Requirements 
Of primary importance for this 
analysis is the impact of the UAS 
concept of operation on the safety of 
the system.  Ensuring and enhancing 
safety of the air transportation system 
is the primary mandate given to the 
FAA and is a fundamental standard in 
the integration of new technologies 
into the NAS.  While the FAA is 
primarily charged with the safety of 
the system in creating regulations and 
policy, there is also a burden on 
manufacturers and operators of UAS 
systems.  The UAS must be designed 
and analyzed to meet FAA system 
safety requirements. 
Safety in the current system is assured through certification and training requirements, operating rules, 
maintenance, and air traffic control services, which are governed by several NAS policies, as shown in Figure 2.  
The difficulty in evaluating potential UAS safety policies is that the new technology presents several unique issues 
in NAS operation.  The integration of UAS into the NAS has impacts on a variety of FAA organizations including 
air traffic operations, flight standards, aircraft, and aircrew certification for an entirely new class of aircraft.  The 
impact on NAS safety through collision avoidance capability and the airworthiness certification of an aircraft 
without occupants present new challenges. 
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Figure 2: UAS Policy Creation Dynamic 
C. Public Perception 
There is a need to examine the influence of public perception on the determination of UAS policy.  Public 
perception has had a strong influence on the development and deployment of previous technologies, such as nuclear 
power.  The current public reaction to UAS operations is unknown, as the current operational experience in civil 
airspace has been limited (although preliminary indications are that the public appreciates the use of UAVs for 
public safety, security, and rescue operations).  The anticipation of negative reaction to a major UAV accident has 
been a key source of a precautionary approach to current UAS/NAS policymaking.  It is therefore essential to 
understand the fundamental influences of UAS operation on public perception of risk and the corresponding 
influence on UAS policy.  Previous research suggests that public perception of technological risks does not depend 
heavily on the actual risk, but depends largely on the perceived benefits of the technology, opinion of the technology 
and other factors that are not generally termed as rational3.  The public perception dynamic also presents several key 
issues on risk communication, or how to inform both the general public and users of the system that key risks have 
been considered and mitigated. 
D. Market Forces 
UAS concepts of operation are also subject to external market forces.  The market feedback governs what 
concepts of operation are economically viable, i.e. what missions can be performed profitably.  Market forces also 
drive safety aspects of the concept of operation, through legal liability and insurance requirements. The 
implementation of different mitigation measures has associated costs in several dimensions.  Both up-front and 
recurring capital costs can be incurred to implement mitigation measures.  Initial costs include research and 
development, compliance with regulations, and acquisition of systems.  Recurring costs can arise from personnel 
training and staffing, or operation of systems.  There is also a cost to mission associated with a loss of mission 
capability in terms of loss of payload space, operating restrictions, or a loss of a market.  Therefore, policies enacted 
also constrain the viability of different UAS concepts of operation through several financial mechanisms. 
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IV. Evaluation of Mitigation Measures 
This section outlines the general approach taken to analyze risk mitigation measures.  The systems-level risk 
analysis approach is shown in Figure 3.  In the approach, a UAS operational concept outlines the general functional 
goal of the UAS operations, along with specific functional attributes, such as expected mission profile, control 
architecture, and vehicle to be used.  Risk mitigation measures incorporated into the operational concept are 
examined for their influence on the occurrence of a set of general systems-level hazards through contributory 
hazards or influences of the operational environment.  The mitigation measures can also influence the risk of 
adverse outcomes after the occurrence of a hazardous state.  These mitigation effects are modeled through the 
mitigation event tree.  The end result is an overall level of risk posed by the concept of operation. 
The safety analysis process is iterative.  The risk levels posed by a set of mitigation measures and an operational 
concept are compared to requirements on target levels of safety to determine the requirements additional mitigation 
approaches in the concept of operation.  This requirements generation process addresses the key policy issues 
outlined in the previous section. The risk assessment process in this section lays the foundation for discussion of 
mitigation approaches for two example concepts of operation: High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) UAS, and a 
small UAS used for local missions, discussed in the following sections. 
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Figure 3: Integrated Risk Analysis Framework 
A. Hazardous States 
To add structure to analysis of risks in potential designs, 
risks are defined related to individual hazards, where a hazard is 
defined as a state of the system that could potentially result in an 
accident.  The definition can be interpreted in many different 
ways at varying levels within a system.  The FAA system safety 
handbook differentiates between initiating hazards, contributory 
hazards, and critical events (or primary hazards)4. 
Noting the potential ambiguity in definition of a hazard, it is 
important to define what are considered to be hazardous states 
for the purposes of analysis.  For this paper, hazardous states are 
defined as the general categories in which harm to persons or 
property can occur.  The identified primary and secondary 
hazardous states for UAS operation are shown in Table 1.  This 
allows for the separation of primary hazards, which are expected to b
likely to require mitigation.  The two primary potential contributors
impact and collision with another aircraft.  There are other secondary 
injuries to ground personnel in operating the aircraft, and property 
secondary hazards are important to control, but typically have lower ta
are therefore not as critical in designing mitigation.  There is also a 
been identified in the analysis, denoted as other hazards in Table 1. 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics an
 
4Table 1: Identified Hazardous States 
Primary Hazards 
-Potential midair collision 
-Potential ground impact 
Secondary Hazards 
-Potential harm to operators, ground crew 
-Potential environmental contamination 
-Potential loss of aircraft part or debris 
Other Hazards e critical system design drivers, and the most 
 to loss of life in UAS operation are ground 
hazards, such as environmental contamination, 
damage associated with UAS accidents.  The 
rget levels of safety associated with them, and 
set of unknown hazards that may not have yet 
d Astronautics 
 
 
An example of both contributory hazards and 
environmental factors related to a potential midair 
collision is shown in Figure 4.  The analysis of 
contributory hazards and failure modes is typically 
performed in the context of a well-defined system, to 
determine detailed safety requirements by function.  When 
examining the likelihood of hazard occurrence for a 
general operational concept, the operational environment 
is expected to be the dominant driver of the rate of 
occurrence of primary hazards, as a detailed functional 
description of the concept of operation has not yet been 
formulated.  
 
 
Potential
Midair
Collision
Contributory Hazards
Operational Environment
Loss of Communication 
Degradation of
Situation Awareness
Altitude Deviation
Operational Error
…….
Traffic Density
Mission Profile
Primary Hazard
 
Figure 4: Influence of Contributory Hazards 
and Operation Environment on the Midair 
Collision Hazard 
B. Mitigation Evaluation 
A variety of mitigations can be applied to an 
Unmanned Aerial System both to reduce the 
likelihood of occurrence of primary hazards, and to 
reduce risk after being in an initial hazardous state.  
To categorize different types of mitigation 
measures, an event tree formalism is used in this 
analysis and is shown in Figure 5.  The event tree 
shows the sequence of events that lead from an 
initial hazardous state to their possible outcomes.  
The event sequence begins with the initial exposure 
rate to a hazardous state, denoted by (A) in the 
figure, the input to the event tree.  Mitigation 
measures that reduce the probability of entering a 
hazardous state will be referred to as exposure 
mitigations.  Incorporation of exposure mitigations 
result in a given rate of occurrence of the hazardous 
state per hour, which is the exposure risk of the 
operation. 
Additional events can occur after the exposure to the hazardous state.  These potential events are represented as 
decision nodes in the event tree, denoted by circles in  
Figure 5.  The decision node represents possible downstream 
states of interest.  For this analysis, two potential nodes are 
considered.  Recovery from the initial hazardous state (B) 
either succeeds or fails, and then there are effects (C) after 
the recovery, resulting in possible outcomes categorized by 
the worst-case consequence that can occur.  The recovery 
node (B) can be further divided into detection or recognition 
of the hazardous state, and recovery actions conditional on 
detection.  For this analysis, the functions were combined to 
simplify evaluation of mitigation measures that typically 
couple detection and recovery functions. 
Each decision node has a set of conditional probabilities 
that describe the probability of occurrence of each branch 
conditional upon the previous states.  The overall likelihood 
of each outcome is determined by multiplying conditional 
probabilities through the tree, and risk is aggregated along 
potential consequences in different branches of the tree.  
Mitigations reduce risk of exposure, by modifying the 
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Figure 5: Event Tree Model of Risk Propagation after 
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Figure 6: Illustration of Effectiveness of 
Mitigation Measures 
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likelihood of occurrence of the exposure state, and reduce risk after exposure to a potential hazard by modifying the 
distribution of conditional probabilities at each decision node.  By varying mitigation measures and their conditional 
probabilities in the event tree, the influence on overall risk can be inferred. 
The effectiveness of mitigation measures can be visualized as shown in Figure 6, where the vertical axis 
represents the level of risk at different stages of the event tree analysis.  In this representation, it is recognized that 
there is an unmitigated level of risk that exists based on an assumed mission profile and type of operation described 
by the concept of operation.  If operational exposure limitations are imposed such as overflight restrictions of 
populated areas or altitude restrictions, the level of risk is reduced.  When discussing the example operational 
concepts, the risk of operation will be discussed in terms of the exposure risk, which in some cases includes the 
incorporation of some exposure mitigation measures.  Therefore, the reduction from an unmitigated level of risk is 
denoted by dashed arrows, as it refers to effects that occur before the event tree analysis begins, at state (A). 
The descending solid arrows on the right side illustrate reduction of risk from the exposure risk level by the two 
other classes of mitigation: recovery mitigation measures (B) and effects mitigation measures (C).  The fully 
mitigated level of safety is the vector sum of arrows (A) (B) and (C), labeled as the mitigated level of safety.  For 
most cases, the mitigated level of safety will need to exceed target level of safety requirements to account for 
uncertainties in the effectiveness of different mitigation measures. 
V. High Altitude, Long Endurance Concept Example 
A. Concept Definition 
The high altitude, long endurance (HALE) 
concept of operation is representative of a large 
UAS performing long duration missions in the 
NAS5.  The concept is shown in Figure 7.  The 
concept assumes an initial phase in deployment of 
HALE operations, where the UAS operates above 
FL 180 in Class A airspace, while later phases of 
integration into the NAS will include operation in 
classes C, D, and E as well as Class A airspace.  For 
the initial analysis, this paper will only consider the 
initial steps of the program, and examine risks 
relevant to operation in Class A airspace.  Other 
functional details include: 
LOS 
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Figure 7: HALE UAS Concept of operation
• Combined over the horizon (satellite) and 
within line of sight (direct link) control 
• Large power and payload capabilities of 
vehicle 
• Human supervisory control in a ground station 
• Loiter and transit missions above FL 180 
 
B. Midair Collision Mitigation Measures 
To illustrate mitigation measures applied at different points in the system, the midair collision hazard will be 
examined for the HALE concept of operation.  The influences on the different branch probabilities, and associated 
potential mitigation measures are shown in Figure 8.  The initial exposure risk is influenced predominantly by type 
of operation.  Higher traffic density and less procedural separation will influence the probability that conditions will 
create a potential midair collision scenario.  Risk reducing mitigations in this category could take the form of 
airspace-related operational restrictions. 
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After a potential midair collision state is present, 
detection capability depends on encounter 
characteristics, sensor performance, composition and 
equipage of other traffic, and capability of the HALE 
ground station.  Recovery will be influenced by the 
operational architecture: whether recovery actions are 
performed autonomously on the vehicle, or by an 
operator removed by a control link with additional 
latency.  For the HALE concept of operation, flight 
occurs in Class A airspace where all aircraft are 
positively separated by Air Traffic Control.  A large 
UAV also has the potential to incorporate advanced 
collision avoidance systems, including TCAS, which 
is being evaluated for the Global Hawk8.  
Additionally, detect sense avoid systems capable of 
detecting both transponder equipped and non-
equipped aircraft have been the focus of significant 
current UAV research to replace an onboard pilot’s 
ability to avoid other traffic. 
Effects mitigation reduces the severity of the 
outcome given that a collision with another aircraft is 
certain to occur.  Such mitigation measures reduce 
the force or energy imparted to the vulnerable aircraft, and are not typically employed in manned aircraft.  For a 
HALE UAV, the impact force imparted could be limited to mitigate damage imparted on another aircraft through 
frangible, distributed mass design of the air vehicle. 
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Figure 8: Midair Collision Mitigation Measures and 
Influences 
C. Detect Sense and Avoid & Equivalent Level of Safety 
A significant amount of current 
research is directed towards 
developing detect, sense, and avoid 
technologies for UAVs.  The stated 
goal is to develop an “equivalent 
level of safety” to current manned 
aircraft operations.  This approach is 
illustrated in Figure 9, where 
Potential HALE UAS mitigation 
measures are compared to those 
used in the current manned system.  
Manned aircraft use three layers of 
collision avoidance capability: 
through air traffic control, the 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS), and the pilot’s capability to 
see and avoid other traffic, although 
this capability is diminished in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). 
Integrating the HALE UAS in a similar manner to manned aircraft assumes the same ambient collision risk and 
air traffic control separation capability will exist, but an addition detect sense and avoid system must be incorporated 
to replace the performance of TCAS and the onboard pilot.  It is likely that the new system will need to be designed 
beyond an equivalent level of safety to account for uncertainties in performance.  The equivalent level of safety 
design approach reduces requirements for new UAS policies.  The approach compartmentalizes the requirements 
and system capabilities that must be transferred to the UAS design by equating performance by the same mitigation 
mechanisms in detection and recovery. 
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Figure 9: Detect, Sense and Avoid for HALE UAS
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D. Additional Mitigations and Target Level of Safety 
There are several combinations of exposure, 
detection and recovery, and effects mitigations that 
could be used to achieve a target level of safety.  In 
this section, example operational restrictions and 
effects mitigation combinations will be used to 
illustrate a few notional combinations. 
Operational traffic patterns in the NAS 
concentrates traffic density along airways and on 
major flight levels.  In a prior UAV risk analysis2, a 
simple gas collision model was used to determine the 
risk of midair collisions averaged across all airways 
in the U.S. The analysis assumed random location of 
a UAV with respect to other air traffic, and averaged 
air traffic density based on an FAA ETMS 
surveillance source over 24 hours in 2003.  The 
estimated collision risk is shown in Figure 10.  The 
collision risk shown is an estimate based on the 
assumptions of the model, but it can be noted that the rate of exposure to midair collision condition over several 
orders of magnitude.  The analysis did not consider the flight path of the UAV, which also influences exposure risk 
if it is different from the operational characteristics of other traffic.  
Noting the dependence on 
areas of operation, mitigation 
measures than influence initial 
exposure rate could be 
implemented as operating rules 
that restrict operations of the 
UAS to specific areas of 
airspace.  Several potential 
mitigation combinations to 
achieve an acceptable level of 
safety are shown in Figure 11.  
Under certain restrictions, such 
as operation above the majority 
of commercial air traffic above 
flight level 430, the ambient 
risk could be controlled to be 
lower than the most stringent 
FAA TLS of 10-9 collisions / hr.  
Other possibilities include the integration of UAVs without detect sense and avoid, but with frangible design 
characteristics that lower the risk of a catastrophic outcome should a collision occur, as shown in the middle of the 
figure.  The scenario shown in the right side of the figure is an intermediate level of operating restrictions, with the 
UAV restricted to operation between major flight levels, where traffic density is lower. 
It should be noted that the purpose of this discussion has been to illustrate the different systems-level approaches 
on achieving a target level of safety under several assumptions.  The main assumption is that the primary influence 
on risk is the operational phase of the mission.  During climb or descent, or in abnormal/emergency situations, the 
interaction with other air traffic is different, and risk may increase.  While FAA guidance on safety analysis 
considers an average flight, there is a limit in practice to the amount of risk accepted during different phases of 
operation.  One example of this is the current practice of reporting and reducing accident rates per takeoff and 
departure in commercial operations, as those phases of flight are low as a percentage of flight time, but have a 
disproportionately large rate of accidents9. 
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Figure 10: Expected Collision Rate from a Gas 
Collision Model Averaged Over All U.S. Jet Routes 
for a 24 Hour Period 
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Figure 11: Mitigation Approaches to Achieving a Target Level of 
Safety 
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VI. Small, Local Operational Concept Example 
A. Concept Definition 
The small, local operational concept is 
representative of several current demonstration 
missions where UAVs were used for surveillance of a 
local area for crowd surveillance and local law 
enforcement.  The concept is illustrated in Figure 12 
and shows the use of a relatively inexpensive UAV 
with limited logistical support, controlled through line 
of sight control at low altitude, where the goal is to 
provide a limited surveillance capability of a local area.  
Functional details include:  
 Other 
Traffic
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Operation
Below Majority of 
Air Traffic
Ground Control
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Figure 12: Small UAS Concept of operation 
• Small (30 lb or less) UAV with limited 
payload and power capabilities 
• Line of sight control through limited ground 
station 
• Short duration operation over a limited area 
B. Ground Impact Mitigation 
Small UAVs present unique opportunities to mitigate the risk of potential ground fatalities that have not been 
used in current manned operations.  Potential mitigation measures are summarized in Figure 13 for the three 
categories of mitigation evaluation previously introduced.  With respect to ground impact, the likelihood of exposure 
to harm is influenced primarily by the population characteristics in the area of operation.  To control exposure risk, 
potential mitigation approaches are to operate over local regions of low population density, or over areas where the 
population is specifically sheltered from harm through a 
risk-based guidance system.  Other possibilities include 
limiting UAV mass, or segregating the UAV to areas of 
low population density. 
Small UAS in this concept are likely to be operated 
in populated areas.  In this case, there are additional 
measures that can be used to reduce risk.  Detection and 
recovery capability includes both the prevention of 
system failures and recovery from potential failures.  
Therefore, mitigation approaches include increased 
reliability levels to prevent system failures that would 
cause a ground impact.  Recovery from system failures 
in small UAS may be limited due to interfaces with less 
diagnostic capability, but contingency plans for reacting 
to vehicle failures can also reduce the potential risk to 
the general public.  For example, after a potential 
failure is recognized, the UAS operator or guidance 
system could guide the UAV to a low risk landing site. 
Small UAVs present a unique opportunity to 
incorporate damage mitigation measures that would not 
be possible in manned aircraft.  Without a person 
onboard, UAVs can be sized specifically to fit desired 
sensors, which are continuously shrinking and increasing in performance.  The small size of many current UAV 
designs makes ground fatality risk very small, both due to the size of potential impact area, and the kinetic energy 
imparted by impact, and prior analysis showed that this significantly contributed to a reduction in ground impact 
risk2.  Effects mitigation approaches are possible that would not be possible with occupants onboard the aircraft. 
Active systems can be used that reduce the size of vehicle debris by terminating the flight or utilizing ballistic 
recovery systems if UAV control is lost. 
Influences
•Mission Profile
•Operating Area
•Population Density
•Population Sheltering
Mitigations
•Operating restrictions
•Local Operation over 
low density
•Mass limitations
Influences
•System Failure Rate
•System Monitoring 
Capability
Mitigations
•Diagnosis of failures
•Operator Training
•Reliability Requirements
•Contingency Plans
Influences
•Energy/momentum 
Imparted in collision
Mitigations
•Frangibility
•Flight termination
•Ballistic Recovery
Exposure (A) Detection & Recovery (B)
Effects (C)
 
Figure 13: Ground Impact Mitigation Measures 
and Influences 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
9
 C. Mitigation Measures and Level of Safety 
Three examples are 
shown in Figure 14 to 
illustrate potential systems-
level mitigation approaches 
to achieving a target level of 
safety.  In the first example, 
flight restrictions could limit 
UAS to areas of low 
population density, to limit 
the exposure risk to the 
general public and achieve a 
target level of safety without 
additional mitigation.  This 
is often the approach taken 
for initial experimental 
operation of aircraft in 
isolated areas.  On the other 
hand, the UAS could be operated over high density regions, with vehicle reliability requirements that ensure that 
failures are less likely to expose the public to harm.  The final example illustrates the use of a flight termination 
system, that has the capability to detect if a UAV has entered a high population area, or has lost control such that it 
will impact the ground. 
 
Less Safe
More Safe
Reliability 
Requirements
Target Level 
of Safety
Restricted 
Operation
Operation 
over areas 
of high 
population 
density
High Reliability 
UAV
Flight 
TerminationRestriction 
to local 
areas of 
low 
population
Guidance 
Restrictions and 
Flight 
Termination 
System
Restricted 
operation by 
population 
density
 
Figure 14: Mitigation Approaches to Achieving a Target Level of Safety 
VII. Conclusions 
Unmanned Aerial Systems will be required to meet target levels of safety for operation in the National Airspace 
System.  Based on previous analysis, there is a need to incorporate mitigation measures to reduce risk levels to 
potential regulatory targets.  A methodology was developed to systematically examine the effectiveness of 
mitigation measures at reducing the risk of critical hazards in the operation of Unmanned Aerial Systems.  The 
methodology divides mitigations measures into three categories, based on how they reduce risk.  Exposure 
mitigations reduce the entry into a potentially hazardous state.  Examples include altitude, airspace, or population-
based operating restrictions.  Recovery mitigations facilitate recovery from a potential hazard, such as detection and 
avoidance of a midair collision through Air Traffic Control.  Effects mitigations reduce risk by reducing the 
likelihood or severity of potential outcomes.  Examples include energy reduction measures such as frangible design, 
or flight termination systems.  Based upon the examination of two different concepts of operation, there is clearly a 
variety of alternate mechanisms that can be used to achieve a target level of safety.  Continued investigation is 
needed to determine what mitigations are most effective at reducing risk, and what regulations and policies can be 
implemented to ensure that unmanned aircraft are safely integrated into the National Airspace System. 
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